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eporting the Onset
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Uri Maoz) Liad Mudrik Ram Rivlin) Ian Ross) Adam Mamelak)
and Gideon Yaffe

1. Introduction
In 1965, Hans Kornhuber and Luder Deecke made a discovery that greatly
influenced the study of voluntary action. Using electroencephalography
(EEG), they showed that when aligning some tens of trials to movement
onset and averaging, a slowly decreasing electrical potential emerges over central regions of the brain. It starts l second (s) or so before the onset of the
1
voluntary action and continues until shortly after the action begins. They
termed this the Bereitschaftspotential, or readiness potential (RP; Kornhuber
& Deecke, 1965). This became the first well-established neural marker of voluntary action. In that, the RP allowed for more objective research on voluntary action rather than its previous dependence on subjective introspection.
Two decades later, the RP captured the attention of the wider neuroscience
community as well as of philosophers, legal scholars, and laypeople. This is because it was associated with a key question in the debate on free will: Is human
voluntary action caused by the conscious intention to act? Or does the conscious
experience only follow unconscious neural activity, which is the true origin of
that action, and over which humans have only-limited immediate control?
2

2. The Libet and Follow-Up ExperimentsReadiness Potential and Intention
What associated the RP with free will was the seminal empirical work of
Benjamin Libet and colleagues. Initially they found that endogenous acts that
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are spontaneously capricious in origin (e.g., flexing the wrist or a finger at a
time of one's choice, for no reason or purpose and with no consequences) are
also preceded by an RP (Libet, Wright, & Gleason, 1982). Theywere then surprised by the relatively early onset of RP-over 1 s (one second) before movement onset. And they wanted to know how long before action onset people
became aware of their urge or intention to move. 3 One possibility was that
subjects' awareness of the intention to move also appeared early before movement onset, potentially reflecting a long lag between the time they decided to
act and the moment they executed the action. Alternatively, it could be that
subjects' awareness actually followed-rather than co-occurred with or preceded-the onset of the RP, in which case one may speculate that this awareness is not part of the causal chain leading to action.
These competing hypotheses were put to an empirical test in what is now
commonly known as the Libet experiment (Libet, Gleason, Wright, & Pearl,
1983). But how does one measure the onset of intention? Lacking a reliable neural marker, Libet's solution was to use introspection: 4 subjects were
instructed to flex their right wrist or finger whenever they felt like doing so
and report the position of a rotating spot on a dock when they first felt the
urge to move. The authors termed this reported time of urge onset W time
(W apparently stands for "wanting" to move). They then famously found that
while W time begins about 200 milliseconds (ms) before movement onset,
on average, the RP starts at least 550 ms prior to movement onset.
Since their publication, Libet's results have fostered ongoing discussions,
debates, and criticism and have inspired many further experiments. 5 For
instance, Keller and Heckhausen (1990) replicated the original Libet results,
and also compared the RP generated there to RPs generated before hand
movements that were initiated unconsciously-that is, while the subjects
were occupied by another, attention-grabbing but unrelated cognitive task.
They found the latter RPs to be significantly smaller and of more lateral origin, and suggested that the Libet task, which instructs subjects to time and
report urges to move, led normally unconscious processes to become conscious due to attentional amplification.
Haggard and Eimer (1999) independently replicated the original Libet
results as well. They too expanded on them, first by allowing subjects to decide
both when and which hand to move, and second by computing the lateralized readiness potential (LRP; a variant of the RP that distinguishes between
the neural signals that precede left versus right hand movements and generally
begins in closer temporal proximity to movement onset). Their aim was to test
whether RP was part of the causal chain leading to the intention to act. So they
investigated whether earlier W times are accompanied by earlier RP onsets,
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and they failed to find such a correlation. They did, however, find that LRP
onset co-varied with W time, leading them to suggest that LRP rather than
RP may be at least partially causal in generating awareness of the intention to
move. However, Schlegel et al. (2013) were not able to replicate the correlation
ofLRP and W time with a larger group of participants using several variations
of the analysis techniques used by Haggard and Eimer (1999 ). And Trevena
and Miller (2002) showed that LRP may in fact follow rather than precede
W time. Moreover, in later work, Trevena and Miller (2oIO) showed that RPs
and LRPs occurring before decisions to move were not significantly different
from these signals preceding decisions not to move. Thus, one possibility is
that the RP and LRP are related to general readiness to act rather than to the
specific decision to act now (Pockett & Purdy, 2on). And there appears to be
no clear-cut evidence that either RP or LRP are neural markers of intention
onset, or that they are part of the causal chain leading to intention.
In another study that used the Libet task, Sirigu et al. (2004) showed that
patients who suffered from parietal lesions due to stroke could correctly report
the onset of their movement time, but were not able to report W time. This is in
contrast to cerebellar patients who could report both movement and W times
like healthy subjects. Lafargue and Duffau (2008) further specified these results,
reporting that they could not be replicated in patients with surgical resection
of the inferior parietal lobule (that was performed due to slowly evolving brain
tumors). They suggest that this specific part of the parietal cortex is of interest
because it was demonstrated to be involved in various aspects of awareness of
voluntary action and in the sense of agency. They further speculate that, taken
together, the two studies indicate that the conscious experience of intending to
act could be at least partially compensated following brain damage.
In sum, Libet's claim that the onset of RP (a slow-wave brain negativity
preceding voluntary action, on average over many trials aligned to movement onset) precedes the W time (the reported timing of the first urge to
move) appears valid given the independent corroborating studies. Yet, these
follow-up studies also specify more clearly the conditions under which RP
could be a neural precursor of voluntary action and seem to show that RP is
not a neural marker of intention.

3. Further Criticism of the Li bet Experiment
and the Readiness Potential
In addition to follow-up work extending the original findings, the Libet
experiment also garnered a lot of criticism. Much of that criticism focused

On Reporting the Onset

187

on the seemingly implicit assumptions behind the experiment. The early critique ofLatto (1985) focused on the choice to operationalize voluntary action
using monotonous and random actions. He accepted Libet's (1985) claim
that such movements, at least some of the time, are initiated unconsciously.
However, he contended that these unconsciously initiated movements might
not be completely voluntary. Rather, they appear as such because of the nonecological conditions created by Libet's instructions to his subjects to carry
out voluntary actions, together with the requirement to report the timing
of their so-called intention to move. This combination, he claims, may have
retrospectively converted subjects' movements into voluntary actions in their
minds. 6 For our purposes, Latto's criticism emphasizes the artificial conditions imposed on the participants of the Libet experiments, when instructed
to report, and thus attend, to the onset of their intention.
Latto's criticism therefore stresses the possible attentional confound in the
Libet experiments: to what degree do the results depend on subjects having had
to attend to their intention to act, because of the instruction to time its onset?
The answer, claim Miller, Shepherdson, and Trevena (2on), is "to a considerable extent"; these researchers showed that the amplitude of the RP was significantly smaller when subjects were instructed to only spontaneously press a
key when compared to being instructed to also monitor the clock. More support for attention's role in the formation of the RP was found in the study of
Baker, Piriyapunyaporn, and Cunnington (2012). There, tones that randomly
lasted either 3.5 or 4.5 s were played to subjects. After each tone, subjects were
instructed to reproduce the duration of the tone as accurately as possible by the
duration between two presses of a button. They were asked to wait a bit before
the first button press and were given feedback on how accurately they replicated
the tone's duration after the second button press, in every trial. Therefore, the
timing of the first button press was determined by the subjects at will, while the
second button press reflected the subjects' best estimate of the tone's length.
In line with the hypothesis that RP is tightly related to subjects' attention to
timing, RP before the first button press had a significantly smaller amplitude
than RP before the second button press.7 The authors thereby concluded that
attention to the timing of movement is key to a strong RP. This compounds
the earlier empirical evidence for the role of attention in RP generation, discussed before (Keller & Heckhausen, 1990).8 Nevertheless, it should be noted
that even the studies that were critical of the Libet results all found RPs, though
diminished, before unattended and even possibly before unconscious action.
A different criticism of the RP was recently made by Schurger, Sitt, and
Dehaene (2012). They used a task reminiscent of Libet's (i.e., a general
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instruction to move with no specific movement cue or motivation to
and constructed a stochastic decision model of neural activity. They
showed that, in this model, the precise moment when the decision threshold
was crossed and movement was initiated was mainly determined by subthreshold neuronal fluctuations that were completely spontaneous. Critically.
time-locking this neural activity to movement onset made the fluctuations
appear, on average, as a gradual increase in neuronal activity-akin to the
traditional RP. The authors therefore claimed that the RP is an artifact of the
alignment of the neuronal signal on every trial to movement onset, rather
than a genuine event-related potential that indexes action initiation. They
further suggested that the role of spontaneous neural fluctuations in crossing
the decision threshold is unique to the meaningless and unmotivated movements used in the Libet task.
Thus, critiques of the Libet experiment mainly focus on two issues. First,
its reliance on the RP, whose amplitude and sometimes distribution over
scalp electrodes correlates with the amount of attention that the subject pays
to various facets of the task. Second, while RP reliably precedes unmotivated voluntary action, it may be no more than artifactual to the manner
in which it is calculated-averaging over many trials and aligning to movement onset-reflecting the accumulation of noise leading to unmotivated
decisions.

4. Follow-up Experiments that Do Not Rely
on Readiness Potential
Following this discussion, it seems that the RP does not necessarily reflect
neural activity related to the initiation of voluntary action. Accordingly, the
relation between the RP and subjects' conscious decision to act may not be
so easily interpreted. However, some more recent research no longer relied
on RP or EEG to investigate the temporal relation between neural precursors
of action and the reported time of the decision or intention to act. Instead,
these studies used decoding techniques to decode subjects' upcoming decisions from brain activity that occurred prior to subjects' reported decision
time. For instance, Fried, Mukamel, and Kreiman (20II) showed that some
single-neuron activity in the supplementary motor-area (SMA) and anterior
cingulate-cortex in humans starts to ramp up about a second before W time
and movement time. This was suggested to potentially underlie RP in scalp
EEG (Haggard, 20II).
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Soon, Brass, Heinze, and Haynes (2008) and Bode et al. (20n) had subjects press one button with their left hand or another with their right at a
time of their choice, while observing a randomized sequence of letters that
switched every 0.5 s. Using functional magnetic-resonance imaging (fMRI),
the investigators showed that there is some information about which hand
the subjects would eventually use up to 10 s (ten seconds) before movement
onset from the frontopolar cortex and up to about 8s in advance from the
SMA. The decoding accuracy was low, at about 60%, but significantly above
chance. They further found information coding when the subjects would
move 9 up to 7s or so before movement onset in the pre-SMA; decoding accuracy was at roughly 20%, which was significantly above chance level, at 17%.
These decoding times preceded the reported awareness of the decision when
and which hand to move by roughly ss and 6s, respectively.
Two competing interpretations could be proposed for these results, assuming subjects' reports about the timing of their decisions are accurate. The first
is that the early decoding signals stern from unconscious decision processes
that preceded subjects' conscious intention to rnove,1° and so unconscious
brain activity initiated the action. This interpretation leaves less room for effective, conscious intentions in the causal chain leading to action-at least in
the case of the unreasoned and unmotivated behavior investigated in these
experirnents.1 1 Therefore, it led to a debate about whether the intuitive concept of free will is no more than an illusion (Harris, 2012; Libet, 1985; Mele,
2006, 2009; Roskies, 2010; Sinnott-Armstrong & Nadel, 20II; Wegner, 2002).
However, an alternative interpretation is that these decoded signals relied
on bias activity that has some influence on later action selection but does not
fully define it. For example, ongoing brain activity may break the symmetry
or speed up decisions among similarly valued decisions, creating a bias toward
one of the decision alternatives (Haynes, 20na, 20IIb ). Such a bias may then
be combined with the values the subject associates with the decision alternatives to determine the decision outcome. The influence of the bias would be
greater as the values of the decision alternatives become more similar. In this
vein, we showed that when monkeys were deciding between smaller, more
immediate rewards and larger, delayed ones, their choices could be decoded
from single-neuron activity in frontal cortex and the basal ganglia before they
were even informed of the delays associated with the decision alternatives, and
hence before rational deliberation could begin. As expected, and as the circuit
model we devised suggested, the bias activity was more predictive as the values
of the two alternatives became more similar (Maoz, Kim, Rutishauser, Lee, &
Koch, 2010; Maoz et al., 2013). In all the Libet experiments and follow-ups
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discussed above, the values associated with the random left- or right-hand
movements were generally similar, if not identical. Thus, our results support
the claim that the early decoding signals found in these studies reflect early
bias signals rather than early determination of the action. The single-neuron
activity we found may therefore underlie neural fluctuations that might considerably influence unmotivated decisions about which action to take, similarly to the neural fluctuations that bring about action onset and RP in the
computational model of Schurger et al. (2012).
However, importantly, Libet et al. (1983), Haggard and Eimer (1999),
Soon et al. (2008), Fried et al. (20n) and the other experiments discussed
earlier focused on random decisions: raising a hand, or one of two hands, for
no reason or purpose and with no consequences. 12 But it is not clear to what
extent these random decisions generalize to the more interesting deliberate
decisions humans make every day. In fact, there is some preliminary evidence
that deliberate and random decisions rely on dissociated neural systems. 13

5. Criticism of the Use of W Time
Previously we reviewed some criticism against Libet's experiment, focusing
on the validity of the RP and other neural markers as precursors of intention or action as well as on the generalizability of random decisions to deliberate ones. But another aspect common to all the Libet-paradigm studies,
from those based on EEG, through fMRI, to single-neuron recordings, is
their reliance on Libet's introspective W time to clock the moment subjects
had the conscious intention to act. So, how valid is W time as a measure of
conscious-intention onset?
Measuring W time in the Libet experiment requires subjects to time the
onset of their intention to act with a rotating clock using introspection,
commit it to memory, and retrieve it after movement onset. The various stages
of this process have come under criticism, generally suggesting reasons for the
onset of intention to have occurred earlier than the W time reported by the
subjects. But the majority of the criticism focused on the attempt to externally, yet accurately, time the onset of the intention to act. 14
It was suggested, for instance, that the timing of the intention was biased
due to its reliance on an external rotating clock together with the internal
introspection of time (Jasper, 1985; Wasserman, 1985). In particular, concerns
were raised about the reliability of reports about timing intentions; it was
claimed that the timing in such reports depends on the subjective threshold
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that each participant sets for the strength of a conscious urge that merits
reporting as a full-blown urge, assuming a gradual development of awareness
(Latto, 1985; Marks, 1985). Doubts were even raised about whether an urge is
an instantaneous event with a clear onset (Ringo, I985; this claim is elaborated
later). And it was commented that W time measures the onset of the ability
to report awareness-sometimes termed meta-awareness-rather than the
onset of the awareness itself (Rollman, 1985). Other concerns were that the
attempt to self-monitor an internal process-urge or intention formation in
this case-may interfere with that process, perhaps because it requires switching from introspective to visual attention (Wasserman, 1985). 15 Another type
of criticism noted possible temporal discrepancies between the motor (wrist
Hexion) and sensory (clock-position perception) tasks in the experiment
(Wasserman, 1985), suggesting that this stems from Libet's views of mental
processes as instantaneous-that is, not allowing time for their development,
processing, and propagation (perhaps due to Libet's dualism; Wood, 1985).
Beyond the early criticism directed at the concepts or experimental setup
of the Libet paradigm, recent empirical findings further cast doubt on how
accurately W time measures the onset of the intention to act. Matsuhashi
and Hallett (2008) instructed subjects to move their finger at a time of their
choice-as soon as they formed an intention to move-while tones were
played to them at random times. Importantly, the subjects were required to
cancel their movement if and only if the tone was played after they formed
the intention to move. This paradigm allowed the authors to calculate the distribution of tones in relation to movement onset. And from that distribution
they were able to compute that the intention to move in fact began already
1.4s or so before movement onset. This was about I.2 s earlier than W time in
the Libet experiments, and generally congruent with the onset of the earliest part of the RP. These results could be viewed as supporting the idea that
intention formation is gradual and thus takes time (Latto, 1985; Marks, 1985;
Wasserman, 1985). The task in Matsuhashi and Hallett's (2008) experiment
might have thus prompted subjects to report an earlier phase of the intention
to move than the one reported using W time.
Further criticism against W time as a measure for intention onset comes
from a recent study we conducted with consenting intractable epilepsy
patients, implanted with electrodes as part of their presurgical evaluation.
The patients played a matching-pennies game. At the beginning of each
trial, they pressed a button with each hand, and then decided which hand
they would raise at the go signal, which followed a 5 s countdown. If they
raised the same hand as their opponent, they won $0.10 from that opponent.
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Otherwise they lost $0.10 to their opponent. Both players started
$5.00. If the patient finished the game, which consisted of roughly 50 trials
with more money than her opponent she received that sum in cash fro~
the experimenter. We constructed a system that predicted which hand the
patients would raise 0.5 s before the go signal online and in real time. Its prediction accuracy was at 70%, on average, over two patients. We also applied
this system on retrospective data, with more offiine computational power.
We could then increasingly well decode which hand the patient would
raise, with the decoding accuracy rising above chance already 4 s or so before movement onset. The decoding accuracy reached over 82% correct, on
average, over 7 patients, just before the go signal. If we let the system decode
only on the 70% of the trials on which it was most confident, its average correct decoding rate rose to 92% (Maoz et al., 2012). In separate experimental
sessions, we asked the patients to report when they finalized their decision
regarding the hand they would raise at the go signal by one of two methods. One was by remembering the countdown when they decided (the digits
flipped every 0.5 s)-that is, the Libet condition, though with a digital clock.
The other was by starting the trial with neither button depressed and then
pressing both buttons down at the perceived decision onset (and later, as
usual, raising the chosen hand at the go signal). We found that the decisiononset time reported for the button-press condition was about 500 ms earlier than for the Libet condition, a statistically significant difference. Banks
and Isham (20u) also showed that, when measured with a rotating clock, a
digital clock, and a clock with randomly changing digits, W time preceded
movement onset by 138 ms, 30 ms, and 380 ms, respectively, on average. So,
W time appears to depend both on the manner of reporting (recalling the
countdown at the decision versus pressing buttons as the decision occurred)
and on the type of clock used to time it.
Interestingly, in the original Libet experiment, RT preceded W time by
about 350 ms. So, assuming the results just discussed would generalize to this
experimental condition, the button-press W time would have preceded RP
by more than 100 ms. Therefore, had Libet opted for his subjects to report W
time using button presses (possibly on separate trials, like us, to avoid motion
artifacts in the EEG recordings), he would have found a result congruent with
his intuition. Similarly, had Libet used randomly changing digits to clock W
time, his W time would have preceded RP by about 30 ms. Either way, he may
well have then decided not to publish such results, and the history of this field
might have been quite different.
The conceptual criticisms, experimental suggestions, and experimental evidence suggest that the onset of intention might actually be somewhat earlier
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rhan measured by W time. But even if the onset of intention leads the W time
measured in the Libet paradigm by about a second, it still does not invalidate
results like those of Soon et al. (2008 ), where the temporal gap between the
decoding of action onset or contents and W time was 4-6 s.
Nevertheless, other empirical results join these criticisms to cast doubt on
the validity ofW time as any kind of marker for the onset of intention. Lau,
Rogers, and Passingham (2007) instructed subjects to carry out the Libet
experiment while randomly applying transcranial magnetic-stimulation
(TMS) to their pre-SMA on half the trials (and sham TMS on the other half)
either immediately or 200 ms after movement onset. They found that TMS
shifted the perceived onset of motor intention slightly backward in time and
the perceived onset of action execution slightly forward in time, regardless
of whether it was applied at movement onset or 200 ms later. 16 It therefore
appears that the perceived onset of intention depends, at least partially, on
neural activity that took place after the onset of action.
Even more compelling evidence against W time as a measure of the awareness of intention comes from a study by Banks and Isham (2009 ). There, subjects carried out the Libet experiment, pressing a button that gave no tactile
feedback, while they could not see their hand. They received either auditory feedback (a beep) or visual feedback (a video of their hand pressing the
button). Critically, this feedback was deceptive, with the beeps delayed by 5
to 60 ms, and the video delayed by 120 ms. The results showed that the timing
of the false feedback significantly influenced subjects' report ofW time: irrespective of their actual movement onset, subjects reported W time about 130
ms before the beep, and about 90 ms before the video began. 17 These results
suggest that rather than being able to accurately time the onset of their intention to move, subjects rely on sensory information about the timing of action
execution to infer W time. rs
It is therefore not clear whether W time refers to anything at all from the
conceptual point of view. After all, concepts like will, decision, urge, or intention need not necessarily correspond to a specific neural event. The computational, neural mechanism of decision making may well not imitate the
structure and flow of practical syllogisms 19 or of the folk-psychology conception of intentions or decision making.
What is more, this folk-psychology notion of decision making appears to
be a serial account. According to it, information is retrieved from the senses
and/ or from memory. The alternatives are then weighed and the decision is
made. This then leads to a commitment to a plan of action-immediate or
deferred. This account includes a clear onset of the decision and with it the
intention to act, which W time could then potentially measure. But there
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is mounting evidence that this serial model of decision making may not
accurate. Instead, sensory information and the subJ. ects' current state (e .g.,
motivation, goals, and so on) are apparently used to continuously maintain several conflicting and competing potential action plans in parallel,
and often by the same brain regions that later control the chosen behavior
( Cisek & Kalaska, 2orn; Freedman & Assad, 20II; Gold & Shadlen, 2 007 ;
Kable & Glimcher, 2009; M. N. Shadlen, Kiani, Hanks, & Churchland
2008; Wise, Boussaoud, Johnson, & Caminiti, 1997 ). These parallel actio~
plans appear to be sustained even once the decision has been made and one
of those potential actions begins to be carried out. Keeping a representation of the unselected parallel action plans after action onset may facilitate
quick changes of mind, if required, especially when the decision alternatives
are associated with similar values for the agent (Resulaj, Kiani, Wolpert, &
Shadlen, 2009; Selen, Shadlen, & Wolpert, 2012). Hence, a decision might
be an ongoing, developing process that continuously updates and remains
amenable to changes, rather than a process that converges to a final unalterable outcome at one specific point in time, and is subserved by a definite
brain area or neural system. If this is the case, it might not be possible to
clearly map decision and intention onsets onto a single neural process or
a specific moment in time (Ringo, 1985). In other words, there may be no
place in the neural causal chain leading to action that can be identified as
the decision or the intention.
20

In sum, there are various strong conceptual and empirical criticisms of the
use that the Libet and follow-up experiments made ofW time. It may even be
that intentions have no clear neural correlates, in which case it might be futile
to ask subjects to introspectively time their onset. Or, less radically, even if
neural correlates of intentions do exist, these may not be all-or-none processes
that have a clear onset time that W time could capture. Either way, W time
may well be a folk concept (Banks & Isham, 20n). But, when so instructed,
subjects generally have no problem reporting W time. Yet, what are they
reporting? Empirical results suggest that W time may be backward computed
from movement time after movement onset. And this backward-inferred
timing may well be the afterthought that the subjects are reporting.

6. Conclusions
In the Libet and follow-up experiments, subjects are generally instructed to
pinpoint when they decided and formed an intention to act using an external

On Reporting the Onset

195

dock. However, given the conceptual and experimental criticism cited as well as
some recent empirical results, this approach appears to rely on a systematically
biased measure of intention onset, at best; arguably it is worse, and subjects are
in fact instructed to formulate an artificial mental construct, with no ecological
validity. Indeed, outside the lab it is not dear that decisions are even accompanied by awareness of the intention to act. Humans do not seem to experience
finalizing a decision leading to action onset when steering the wheel of a car to
avoid an obstacle on the road, or when deciding what to wear in the morning (to
the extent that the results in the Libet experiments generalize to such everyday
choices). What is more, it is not dear that for the big decisions in life-like
selecting a partner or career-there is, introspectively, a clear point in time when
the decision was made, and the plan of action, which was not there a moment
ago, emerged. 21 So, perhaps, the Li bet experiments, which rely on W time, are
simply misguided, measuring something that does not independently exist.
What then should neuroscientists do to investigate the relation between
awareness of the urge, intention, or decision to act and the neural correlates of
this action? They should not ask subjects to report intention onset or W time
during the same trials where they carry out the action, because these reports
apparently confound the neural precursors of action that are measured in the
experiment. They also render the experimental task and the action measured
therein much less ecological, and by that decrease its validity and generalizability to everyday situations. If one insists that W time is a valid measure,
previous literature has rather well delineated the distribution ofW times that
subjects report with respect to movement time for Libet-like tasks. So this
distribution could be used instead of measuring W time during the experiment, at least when subject-specific or trial-by-trial information about W
time is not needed.
A better approach would be to consider decision making a continuous process rather than a discrete one. Then, one could identify neural markers that
track deliberation leading to decisions and reflect the (potentially gradual)
buildup of intention, to the extent that it exists and is approachable with our
technology. One idea is to construct a decoder of the upcoming action and
investigate where its accuracy plateaus in relation to action onset. The moment where the decoder plateaus would then replace W time as the proxy for
decision onset. Work of this sort appears to have found correlates of deliberation, in the form of evidence gathering leading to decisions in the monkey
brain for perceptual judgments (the random dot-motion task), at least for eye
movements (Gold & Shadlen, 2001, 2007; Shadlen & Newsome, 2001). And
some work on humans demonstrated encoding of what could be intentions
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for random decisions (purposeless addition and subtraction of small numbers) using fMRI (Haynes et al., 2007; Soon, He, Bode, & Haynes, 20 13 ).
But the most rigorous and convincing demonstration of such neural markers
of decisions might be in closed-loop experiments, where these markers are
identified and analyzed online and in real time (Maoz et al., 2012) and then
potentially used to control a task on the fly (Cerf et al., 2010 ). Such experiments could, for example, track the neural correlates of decision reversals as
they occur, and even attempt to influence them. While some work in this
direction has already been done, much more remains ahead. And neuroscientists should perhaps devote more resources to attempts of this kind instead of
trying to better understand the relation of neural precursors of action and the
potentially nonexistent W time.
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an urge is the wish to carry out an action or the conscious experience of an impeding intention. Also, by intentions here we mean proximal intentions. For more
details about these distinctions see Mele, 2009. Nevertheless, it is not clear that
subjects are able to differentially report the onset of their urges, intentions, and
decisions. We generally refer to intentions rather than urges or decisions here.
4. The discovery of the RP enabled neuroscientists to speculate about the neural pro-

cess leading to action. Similarly, a neural marker for intention may allow neuroscientist to investigate the brain processes leading to intention onset. However,
such a neural marker need not be more "genuine" or in any way superior to introspection when it comes to measuring the onset of intention, for instance. And this
marker may well be no more than a neural correlate of this introspection.

5. We attempt to describe some key studies pertaining to the Libet experiment here.
But a full account of the follow-up conceptual and empirical work is beyond the
scope of this chapter. See Banks and Packett (2007 ), for example, for a review.
6. Although the conclusions of Keller and Heckhausen (1990) are similar to Latto's
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7. It should be noted that while the three criticisms cited invoke the effect of attention to timing, they all focused on different aspects of such attention: Latto (1985)
discussed attention to the onset of intention. Miller et al. (20n) investigated attention to the W-time clock. And Baker et al. (2012) looked at attention to the
timing of movements.
8. Keller and Heckhausen (1990) studied the effect of attention on RP in the main

task versus the distractor task.
9. They divided the IO s before movement onset into r.67 s bins, and attempted to
identify in which of the 6 time bins movement could begin.

NOTES
I.

logical limitations of current brain imaging technologies.

We distinguish between voluntary action (sometimes just action) and movement.
We tend to think that for an action to be voluntary at least one of the followingwhether to carry the action out, when to perform the action, or which action to
execute-must be up to the agent, in the sense that it depends on the agent's decision or intention (Haggard, 2008). The term movement refers more generally
to any kind of displacement of body parts due to any cause-voluntary, reflexive,
following the application of external force, and so on.

2.

IO. The weak decoding accuracy ( 60% and 20%) would then be attributed to techno-

The RP is a more complex neural phenomenon than discussed here, possibly composed of an early and late component, for instance. For details, see Shibasaki and
Hallett, 2006.

3. While Libet and much of the follow-up literature do not generally distinguish

between the urge, intention, and decision to move, these concepts are not identical, which leads to conceptual confusions that permeate the literature. Briefly,
an intention entails at least a temporary plan to go through with an action, while

II.

A key concern in case conscious intentions are ineffective for action is what this
entails for our notions of moral and legal responsibility. For a discussion of the extent to which these concerns are warranted see Maoz and Yaffe, 2014; Yaffe, 2on.

12. An exception is Maoz, Ye, Ross, Mamelak, and Koch (2012), which investigated
predicting decisions in a competitive matching-pennies game and is described in
this chapter.
13. Mudrik, Maoz, Yaffe, and Koch, The role of consciousness in deliberate and

random decisions: an ERP study, in preparation; and Packett and Purdy,

2011.

14. Although the use of working memory as an indicator of consciousness was also

found suspect (Jasper, 1985).
15. This might be part of a cognitive analogue of Heisenberg's uncertainty principle

(Stamm, 1985).
16. The effect size in this experiment is small, shifting W time by I0-20 ms.
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17. The auditory delays were of 5, 20, 40, and 60 ms. And, interestingly, this experimental manipulation had subjects report W times that followed EMG onset
all but the s ms-delay condition.

Bode, S, He, AH, Soon, CS, Trampe!, R, Turner, R, & Haynes, JD. (20u). Tracking the

18. Following the results of Sirigu et al. (2004), discussed earlier, it seems that the

Cerf, M, Thiruvengadam, N, Mormann, F, Kraskov, A, ~ian ~iorga, R, & Koch, C.

neu~al s.ystem in~olved in generating W time is not the same as that used for generatmg mformation about the timing of movement onset.
19. Aristotle suggested representing practical reasoning in syllogistic form, the conclusion of which is an action. Thus, for example, the decision to drink a glass of

unconscious generation of free decisions using uitra-high field fMRI. PLoS One,
6( 6), e21612.
(2010 ). On-line, voluntary control of human temporal lobe neurons. Nature, 467,
1104-no8.
Cisek, Paul, & Kalaska,John F. (2010 ). Neural mechanisms for interacting with a world

full of action choices. Annual Review of Neuroscience, 33, 269-298.

water might be compounded from the following argument: (1) water can quench
thirst; ( 2) I am thirsty; (3) this is a glass of water; which together entail the action

Freedman, DJ, & Assad, JA. (20n). A proposed common neural mechanism for cat-

of drinking the water (or forming the intention to drink it). This is similar to the

Fried, I, Mukamel, R, & Kreiman, G. (20 l r). Internally generated preactivation of single

manner by which an ordinary syllogism entails its conclusion. However, even if

neurons in human medial frontal cortex predicts volition. Neuron, 69, 548-562.
Gold, JI, & Shadlen, MN. (2001). Neural computations that underlie decisions about

this model can be used as a standard for evaluating and justifying rational behavior,
it is not necessarily an adequate description of the neural mechanisms underlyin
g
..
.
dec1s10ns or act10ns.
20. While several well-known computational models exist for decision making, it
appears that they generally assume the serial account of decisions, at least implicitly (e.g., Gold & Shadlen, 2007; Palmer, Huk, & Shadlen, 2005; Ratcliff &
Rouder, 1998; Wong & Wang, 2006). It would be both interesting and important
to construct a computational model of decision making with the characteristics
described above. Potentially more difficult, though possibly more rewarding,
would be to construct a neural-circuit model of decision making, which would
be closer to the neural hardware than more abstract models like drift-diffusion or
race-to-threshold.

egorization and perceptual decisions. Nature Neuroscience, 14(2), 143-146.

sensory stimuli. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 5(1), 10-16.
Gold, JI, & Shadlen, MN. (2007 ). The neural basis of decision making. Annual Review
ofNeuroscience, 30, 535-574.
Haggard, P. (2008). Human volition: towards a neuroscience of will. Nature Reviews
Neuroscience, 9(12), 934-946.
Haggard, P. (20n). Decision time for free will. Neuron, 69(3), 404-406.
Haggard, P, & Eimer, M. (1999 ). On the relation between brain potentials and the
awareness of voluntary movements. Experimental Brain Research, 126(1), 128-133.
Harris, Sam. (2012). Free will. Simon & Schuster.
Haynes, JD. (20ua). Beyond Libet. In W. Sinnott-Armstrong & L. Nadel (Eds.),

21. Again, such distal, deliberate decisions are conceptually different from the prox-

Conscious will and responsibility (pp. 85-96). Oxford University Press.
Haynes, JD. (20ub). Decoding and predicting intentions. Annals of the New York

imal, random ones of the Libet paradigm (Mele, 2009 ), and may well be empirically different too.

Haynes, JD, Sakai, K, Rees, G, Gilbert, S, Frith, C, & Passingham, RE. (2007 ). Reading

Academy of Sciences, 1224(1), 9-21.
hidden intentions in the human brain. Current Biology, 17(4), 323-328.
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